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ABSTRACT
This article examines the merits of defining a class of offensive destructive 
cyber weapons as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It analyzes the 
growing danger of destructive cyber weapons in the future joint operating 
environment and the devastating effects they may have in the physical 
domain. Further, it outlines evidence that specifically coded, offensive 
destructive cyber weapons would meet the spirit and intent of the three 
academic conditions for categorization as WMD. It argues the merits of 
categorizing a class of destructive cyber weapons as WMD, and addresses 
important factors required to examine advantages afforded to policy 
makers. Towards this end, the paper offers two recommendations for 
consideration to account for the value in designating a class of destructive 
cyber weapons as WMD. The recommendations include a proposed cyber 
deterrence theory of “Attributed Response Assured,” and outline how this 
theory could support a U.S. cyber policy of strategic ambiguity. Further, it 
recommends defining acceptable behaviors for cyber activity by the inter-
national community. In the absence of a U.N.-led effort, the establishment 
of a Proliferation Security Initiative-type agreement could further steps 
to clarify “norms” and communicate “redlines” to potential adversaries. 
These steps would assist policy makers in the collective effort towards 
enabling the security of a networked world against the most dangerous 
cyber threats capable of causing mass casualties or mass destruction.
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INTRODUCTION
The destructive potential of unconstrained cyber warfare is a maturing 
threat that warrants the full attention of defense policy makers. To put the 
danger and the corresponding policy opportunities in perspective, one 
can view the emergence of specifically coded offensive destructive cyber 
weapons in context of the world in 1946. The previous year America had 
dropped atomic bombs to end World War II, and in the aftermath came 
the genesis of new strategies and policies on the nature of warfare. Al-
though it proved impossible to foresee the impact atomic weapons would 
have in constructing new ways of thinking about the future character of 
war, policy makers fully embraced strategies capable of unleashing the 
destructive potential of this continuation of politics by yet another means. 
To avoid the possibility for unconstrained use of offensive cyber weapons 
capable of causing mass casualties or mass destruction, the United States, 
in partnership with the international community, should evaluate the 
emerging role of cyber weapons in the context of the future joint operat-
ing environment. Towards that end, this article argues that defining a class 
of offensive destructive cyber weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) presents multiple advantages to US decision makers, to include 
advancing international and domestic cyber policy options to defend 
against and deter cyberattacks purposefully designed to cause mass 
casualties or mass destruction. This article presents the argument in full 
acknowledgement that cyber weapons must remain valid tools for future 
military operations. As such, the argument is limited in scope to those spe-
cific offensive destructive cyber weapons designed to cause mass casual-
ties or mass destruction.
A review of the growing danger of destructive cyber weapons is neces-
sary to assess the appropriateness of establishing a class of those weap-
ons as WMD. A key component in addressing this issue is to examine the 
evolution of offensive destructive cyber weapons and their destructive 
potential in the physical domain. It is the destructive effects of special 
weapons that policy makers would normally evaluate for the appropri-
ateness to align them under the WMD umbrella. Finally, it will offer two 
recommendations to assist policy makers in advancing cyber policy op-
tions to defend against and deter cyberattacks purposefully designed to 
cause mass casualties or destruction. It also proposes a cyber deterrence 
theory of Attributed Response Assured. Although specific audiences may 
value the additional details afforded by classified information, the scope 
of discussion and sources of information in this article are purposefully 
limited to open source publications in order to enable conversations with 
a broader audience. 
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IS IT A WMD? ASSESSING CYBER’S 
DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL
The question on if the destructive nature of cyber weapons warrants “spe-
cial” classification as WMD has limited historical context. The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) formally acknowledged the potential for destructive cyber 
effects in 2004. At the time, the JCS considered associating the destruc-
tive potential of cyber weapons to a revised definition of WMD. Limited to 
a footnote in the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), the JCS recon-
ceptualized WMD in the broader context of the effects achieved. Towards 
this end, the Joint Staff introduced the term Weapons of Mass Destruction 
or Effect (WMD/E). The term WMD/E’s expanded definition suggests the 
NMS authors were attempting to find balance between the known “de-
structive kinetic effects” of WMD weapons and the “disruptive impact” 
of more asymmetrical weapons available to terrorists and other aggres-
sive states.1 At present, the JCS recognizes that offensive actions in and 
through cyberspace may create degradation, disruption, or destruction 
effects in the physical domain.2
In February 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter confirmed that 
the United States was using cyber as a weapon of war. In referencing US 
military actions against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), Secretary 
Carter said, “Just like we drop bombs, we’re dropping cyber bombs.”3 
While specifics on US cyber capabilities are not available in the open 
source, the New York Times in June 2017 described the United States as 
using its “most sophisticated offensive cyber operation” where it was tar-
geting ISIS online videos and propaganda.4 The cyber weapons employed 
against ISIS denied their computer administrators access to accounts and 
deleted some content. Cyber weapons described as the “most sophisti-
cated” that change passwords or delete content would seem to support 
an argument that cyber weapons are intended to be more disruptive than 
destructive. Open source information suggests, however, that the Unit-
ed States may have cyber weapons with the ability to cause destructive 
effects in the physical domain, for example malware similar to the Stuxnet 
malicious code capable of ‘blowing up nuclear centrifuges’ in Iran, or com-
puter viruses designed to ‘sabotage missile launches’ in North Korea.5 The 
effects of these two attacks would not rise to the level of WMD, but offer 
context towards the evolving destructive potential of cyber weapons.
The US Intelligence Community appears to support an argument that the 
intent of cyber weapons are its disruptive effects. Former Director of Na-
tional Intelligence James Clapper, in testimony to the US Senate in 2016, 
described cyber as an exploitable domain used by adversaries to conduct 
“espionage, theft, extortion, and other criminal activities.” These activities 
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do not suggest a destructive effect. Director Clapper acknowledged, how-
ever, that Russia and China had “sophisticated cyber programs,” and that 
Iran and North Korea were enhancing their “attack capabilities.”6
While US security strategies have traditionally highlighted WMD threats 
from state actors, most notably “rogue states” such as Iran and North 
Korea, as well as violent extremist organizations who claim to be pursu-
ing nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons (CBRN), they 
acknowledge the danger associated with cyber weapons is real and 
credible. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy 
acknowledges, “cyberattacks…have the capability to harm large numbers 
of people and institutions.”7 The 2015 National Military Strategy specifi-
cally calls out particular concern with the proliferation of “cyber capabil-
ities,” referencing this concern in the same sentence as WMD.8 The 2014 
Quadrennial Defense Review states the Department of Defense “must be 
able to defend the Nation from an imminent, destructive cyberattack on 
vital US interests.”9
In assessing the destructive potential of cyber weapons, the discussion 
must avoid focusing on US cyber weapon executions currently restrained 
by policy or authorities.10 Lt Gen Jeffrey Harrigian, Commander, US Air 
Forces Central Command, said in a December 2016 interview that allied 
countries had the authority to “employ cyber weapons and techniques 
against ISIS” that US cyber forces were not permitted to execute.11 As 
described by the New York Times, the restrained use of US cyber weapons 
against ISIS is purposefully limited in execution by policy to disruptive 
effects. To assess the threat of employing cyber weapons as WMD more 
comprehensively, defense policy makers must focus on its destructive 
capabilities and potential if unconstrained. 
There is a single framework available to assess if specific cyber weapons 
meet the threshold for classification as a WMD. In his book, Countering 
WMD, Air War College Professor and WMD expert Al Mauroni specifies 
three basic conditions that a for weapon systems should meet to be 
defined as a WMD.12 The system’s fundamental design is the initial consid-
eration for the system to act as a weapon. To meet this threshold, there 
are two examples to consider. First, the 2009 Stuxnet worm that dam-
aged the centrifuges involved in Iran’s nuclear program is assessed as the 
“world’s first digital weapon” and the code was fundamentally designed 
to cause physical destruction on equipment controlled by computers.13 
Second, Secretary of Defense Carter’s confirmation the United States 
uses cyber in the form of “cyber bombs” and as a weapon of war further 
supports an argument cyber code designed to cause destruction in the 
physical domain has met this initial condition.14
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The second condition Mauroni set is a determination that the 
weapon has the “capability to cause mass causalities (defined as 
more than one thousand injuries or deaths) at a single point in 
time and space.”15 The DOD Law of Armed Conflict outlines three 
examples where cyber weapons could be employed to achieve 
mass casualties. Specifically, cyber operations that: 
trigger a nuclear plant meltdown; 
open a dam above a populated area, causing destruction; or 
disable air traffic control services, resulting in airplane crashes.16
These examples demonstrate meeting the second condition.
Mauroni’s final condition is that the WMD should be “defined by interna-
tionally accepted conventions as a ‘special’ category of weapons sys-
tems.”17 While there is not currently an international convention, there 
have been attempts to explore such a possibility. The international com-
munity has discussed the broader topic, establishing the current inter-
national position that international law and in particular, the U.N. Charter 
is applicable to acts in and through cyberspace, as published in the 2013 
U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE) consensus report on cy-
berspace.18 The UNGGE’s subsequent work failed to produce a report that 
further clarified the legal framework, instead calling for further delibera-
tions.19 However, the international community’s efforts meet the spirit of 
the third condition for WMD classification.
WHY NOW: EXAMINING THE EVOLUTION OF 
CYBER WEAPONS 
In 2008, the Air Force commissioned a RAND study to review the op-
erational realities of being able to “fly and fight in cyberspace.”20 The 
resulting product, titled Cyber Deterrence and Cyberwar, determined the 
greatest danger to the United States from cyberspace might be opera-
tional rather than strategic. The study’s authors concluded, “strategic cy-
berwar, by itself, would annoy but not disarm an adversary.”21 To engage 
in strategic cyberwar, RAND argued, is to assume a level of risk that an 
adversary worthy of such an attack has the capability to respond militarily 
in ways that would do more than simply annoy. RAND also challenged any 
assertion that cyber warfare can win a nation’s wars independently and 
decisively. Even if cyber threats were assessed as operational rather than 
strategic, the report provided a comprehensive argument for why cyber 
deterrence is necessary to ensure the United States maintains superiority 
in the information medium. In short, approximately 10 years ago cyber 
1.
2.
3.
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weapons were perceived as Weapons of Mass Annoyance and the cyber 
topic in general proved to be a subject defense senior leaders and policy 
makers struggled to comprehend.
For example, the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) gave a presentation 
in September 2012 at the Air Force Association’s annual conference in 
Washington DC22. During his remarks, the CSAF in part focused on cyber 
security, an issue he viewed as an Air Force priority. He openly acknowl-
edged and described in colorful details his ignorance on the topic. Air 
Force Chief of Staff requested cyber professionals “dumb down” briefings 
and avoid using “cyber talk” so he and other senior leaders could better 
understand the problem.23 He predicted it would take 30 years to replace 
those in the top ranks who lacked a strategic understanding of cyber with 
experts. It is unlikely this reference disparaged senior leaders, and CSAF’s 
comments were likely purposeful in an attempt to add humor to a discus-
sion made in a public forum. However, the comments suggest that only 
five years ago there were senior defense leaders who were unprepared to 
address cyber policy development, or possibly even appreciate the poten-
tial role of cyber weapons. Due to the rapid nature of advancements in the 
cyber domain, it becomes imperative that senior defense leaders have suf-
ficient understanding of how cyber contributes to the defense of America 
and can articulate the need for new or updates to existing policy.
In June 2014, the National Defense University (NDU) Center for the Study 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction explored the potential of formally cate-
gorizing and recognizing cyber weapons as WMD.24 Looking forward to 
the strategic future set in 2030, the authors wrote that it would be inap-
propriate and possibly disadvantageous to the United States to apply the 
WMD designation to cyber weapons at the time. Their rationale was the 
seemingly nascent state of cyber weapon policy and strategy develop-
ment. Until the United States had a strategy that outlined how to opera-
tionalize cyber weapons, it seemed counterintuitive to add the WMD clas-
sification to cyber. For in doing so, they assessed there would be risk in 
prematurely constraining a capability that could in reality maximize flexi-
bility options for decision makers. The NDU article further acknowledged 
that a cyber WMD treaty would normally be associated with provisions to 
limit cyber’s use, or set in motion steps to eliminate or control certain cy-
ber threats. With all the potential negatives, the report was unable to find 
any advantages to categorizing cyber as WMD. 
Changes in 2015 to the DOD Law of Armed Conflict manual suggest a le-
gal foundation that may support categorizing a class of offensive destruc-
tive cyber weapons as WMD. The three examples previously referenced 
describe scenarios of cyber operations where mass casualties may occur: 
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Nuclear reactor meltdown, opening a dam near population centers, and 
causing airplane crashes. A determination would be helpful, as confron-
tations and crises in and through the cyber domain that have already 
occurred. In addition to the Stuxnet attack previously described, the 
media has reported other cyberattacks. Russia conducted a cyberattack 
and shut down the Ukrainian power grid affecting hundreds of thousands 
of people. Russia also conducted a denial of service attack against Es-
tonia allegedly for removing a war memorial. North Korea targeted an 
American entertainment organization due to a movie perceived to portray 
their supreme leader negatively, leading to significant economic damage. 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has lost much of the claimed territory for its 
self-proclaimed caliphate; however, it continues to maintain a footprint in 
the cyber domain. A few months ago, it was reported Russian hackers are 
targeting US nuclear plants. Consequently, the opportunity has narrowed 
for further strategic pause to assess the role or debate the merits of defin-
ing specific cyber weapons as WMD.
While a destructive cyberattack with WMD-type effects has not yet 
occurred, the persistently offensive cyber environment suggests it may 
be the threat of the future.25 The informed senior leaders of today who 
acknowledge the value in constraining cyberspace to deter offensive 
destructive cyberattacks appear to have firm legal footing to add formal-
ly, a class of cyber weapons to the WMD category. Armed with an un-
derstanding that cyber weapons have evolved beyond Weapons of Mass 
Annoyance, policy makers can initiate actions immediately by assuming 
a leadership role to find opportunities for sustainable solutions that may 
deter the potential use of offensive destructive cyber weapons capable 
of mass casualties or mass destruction in the future. The following section 
offers two recommendations for policy makers to consider as they assess 
the advantages of designating specific cyber weapons as WMD to prepare 
for these future challenges.
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 1
Attributed Response Assured: Discussion on Cyber Deterrence
Deterrence is a critical component in mitigating the potential for state and 
non-state entities to employ cyber weapons capable of WMD-type effects. 
Furthermore, it can help prevent a dangerous trend of spreading mali-
cious technology, such as destructive cyber weapon coding, from state 
actors to violent extremist organizations or other “rogue states.” It seems 
probable the United States, in releasing to the media information about 
the existence of what Secretary Carter called “cyber bombs,” purposeful-
ly intended for the international community to know that it has offensive 
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cyber capabilities, as well as the will to employ them. The reason for doing 
so is likely to enhance its cyber deterrence efforts. 
Robert Pape defines deterrence in his book Bombing to Win as actions 
taken to persuade a state from initiating specific actions because the esti-
mated risk of doing so outweighs the perceived benefits.26 Thomas Schell-
ing’s view of deterrence, as described in his book Arms and Influence, is 
the “diplomacy of violence.” Put another way, it is the bargaining power 
behind a credible threat of damage by the stronger party that causes 
another to yield or comply with demands.27 In short, a state must com-
municate its intentions clearly, and its communication must be credible in 
order for a deterrence strategy to be effective. However, the high-level of 
sophistication combined with the anonymous nature of the cyber domain 
adds an additional requirement to the deterrence framework: The state or 
non-state actor contemplating a cyberattack must be convinced the other 
party has sufficient digital investigative and forensics capability to attri-
bute the attack to the correct source. 
In this light, the challenge is to develop a comprehensive cyber deter-
rence theory that effectively persuades state and non-state actors from 
conducting destructive cyberattacks against US interests. To be effective, 
US cyber deterrence policy must command the attention of the interna-
tional community so adversaries weigh the ramifications of conducting a 
destructive cyberattack in their pre-attack calculus. Most importantly, the 
theory needs to support a desired end state of strategic stability. The cy-
berattack deterrence policy for state actors may by necessity be different 
from one focused on violent extremist organizations. Maintaining a prin-
cipal assertion that non-state actors who resort to cyberwarfare remain 
engaged in politics by another means it would seem plausible that deter-
rence could be successful if potential actions were assessed as adversely 
affecting the organization’s ability to achieve its political goals. This line of 
reasoning is at odds, however, with the presumption that terrorists cannot 
be deterred, a theory endorsed by former President Bush in 2006.28 Com-
mon ground between these two theories is the belief violent extremist 
organizations conduct attacks, to include cyberattacks, in order to achieve 
some end. W. Elaine Bunn wrote that defensive deterrence, which cor-
relates to denying non-state actors the benefits of conducting terror-type 
attack tactics, might be more effective than the Cold War approach of 
deterrence by punishment.29 Regardless, both defensive deterrence and 
deterrence by punishment against non-state actors operating in the cyber 
domain requires additional examination to maximize any benefits.
The 2015 DOD Cyber Strategy clearly states the United States will respond 
to a cyberattack against its interests. The United States will choose the 
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time, place, and manner of response, using what is described as the ap-
propriate and lawful instrument of US power.30 It seems, therefore, the US 
position on cyberattack response is one of strategic ambiguity. The value 
in ambiguity is that an adversary remains challenged in solving a risk vs. 
benefit calculus equation. If the adversary wonders what their fate might 
be, it would likely be deterred from launching a cyberattack. A component 
of the pre-attack calculus, however, will be an evaluation whether or not 
the threat of response is credible. According to author Lawrence Freed-
man, “Credibility was also assumed to be based on how past commit-
ments had been honored.”31
The US response to the North Korean Sony cyberattack offers some in-
sight into how an adversary may calculate the response credibility of the 
United States. The Washington Post reported President Obama pledged 
to conduct a “proportional response” to the North Korean cyberattack, 
and later imposed economic sanctions against their government.32 The 
Post article further stated the United States decided to take action in a 
manner it had never done before in “response to a cyberattack by another 
nation; it named the government responsible and punished it.”33 A pub-
lic declaration that the White House had not responded until 2015 to a 
state-sponsored cyberattack does not appear to indicate a precedent of 
US action taken in response to communicated threats that an adversary 
would find credible. As most cyberattacks will fall below the threshold of 
mass destruction, and may not necessarily warrant a military response, the 
United States should consider clearly establishing a “redline” for response 
to help bridge any perceived credibility gap.34
A metric that specifies the threshold of destructive effects that would 
warrant a response would be a valuable initial step. While US policy is 
absent the specific details, the New York Times quoted Secretary of De-
fense Carter as defining a major cyberattack as “something that threatens 
significant loss of life, destruction of property, or lasting economic dam-
age.”35 The same article continued, citing officials, the United States cares 
mostly about “the top two percent of all cyberattacks.”36 It is unclear, 
but probable; Secretary Carter’s definition of major cyberattack is not 
limited to destructive attacks and includes disruptive attacks. As such, 
some senior defense officials would include cyberattacks used to disrupt 
a strategic capability, such as missile warning or nuclear command and 
control, which would blind the United States against incoming missiles or 
from communicating with our strategic forces, as a major cyberattack.37 
Much like the promise of mutually assured destruction if nuclear weapons 
were launched, the United States may prevent the destructive effects of a 
cyberattack by specifying that attacks that cause more than one thousand 
casualties, the only hard number to define mass casualties in US policy, for 
Hatch: Defining a Class of Cyber Weapons as WMD
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
52https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.1.1657
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, Article 3
example, would cross America’s response threshold.38 Without clarifying 
details, there may potentially be undesired actions taken in response to a 
cyber policy of strategic ambiguity.
An unintended consequence of such a policy is that it may actually invite 
state and non-state actors to engage in a series of probing cyberattacks in 
order to test America’s will and response preferences. An example is the 
US cruise missile attacks against al Qaeda camps in the 1990s. Instead of 
deterring future attacks, they were seen as “another small and cowardly 
step by a wounded tiger.”39 As a result, if the United States is slow to act 
or fails to respond proportionately to a cyberattack, it is reasonable to ex-
pect state and non-state actors to attempt additional provocative attacks. 
Communicating clear “red lines” on the use of destructive cyber weapons 
capable of mass casualties or mass destruction is a necessary step to-
wards an effective deterrence.
The same goes for attribution. If state or non-state actors believe they can 
conduct cyberattacks anonymously, it may encourage more groups to 
make cyber capabilities the preferred means to commit destructive acts. 
There are generally two types of attribution: Technical and geographic 
source.40 A robust capability to establish attribution of a WMD-type cyber 
weapon to a geographic source enables decision makers to hold direct 
dialogue and focus on response options against a state or non-state actor 
operating from that area. Technical attribution may be more valuable 
for attacks emanating from the sovereign territory of a specific nation 
where the government denies responsibility for an attack attributed to 
that nation geographically. Therefore, if the United States responds, it 
would be prudent to conduct a robust information campaign in parallel to 
the response, highlighting evidence of how the United States confirmed 
attribution, to maximize any benefits associated with the counterattack. 
Regardless, effectively deterring cyberattacks will remain the best ap-
proach towards enabling the safety and security in the cyber domain. The 
question for cyber deterrence, therefore, is what theory would best ensure 
adversaries are deterred from conducting a cyberattack.
The present author has developed a cyber deterrence theory for consider-
ation  coined “Attributed Response Assured.”41 This theory seeks to deter 
WMD-type cyberattacks by reinforcing two conditions: One, it assures ad-
versaries the United States will respond to a cyberattack against its inter-
ests that results in mass casualties or mass destruction once attributed to 
a state or non-state actor, and two, the response will employ all appropri-
ate instruments of national power in any domain. A capability to attribute 
cyberattacks is the most critical element of this theory as it can persuade 
an adversary against conducting attacks if their attack calculus included 
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a perceived ability to hide behind a cloak of anonymity or make it appear 
another party was responsible. Comparisons in the value of a credible 
response assurance can be made to the mutually assured destruction the-
ory of nuclear deterrence that specifies neither side would attack if there 
were a mutual assurance both sides would be destroyed in nuclear war. 
Attributed Response Assured signals to an adversary that if one dares to 
launch a WMD-type cyberattack, they can expect the United States to at-
tribute the attack, after which the responsible party will encounter punish-
ing reprisal actions. This approach nests under the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy goal of being strategically predicable, but operationally unpre-
dictable.42 As necessary, response options for attributed attacks should be 
considered from the perspective of the adversary to ensure the response 
maximizes its persuasiveness against future attacks.
The United States may enhance the credibility of its cyber deterrence 
policy by establishing a class of WMD cyber weapons, and delegating to 
military commanders at the appropriate level the authority to respond to 
cyberattacks below the WMD threshold. Delegating authorities would im-
prove integration of cyberspace operations into joint military operations, 
and thereby enhance the lethality of the joint force. This approach to cy-
ber policy would acknowledge that the most devastating cyberattacks are 
different in character from most other cyberattacks, and could enable mil-
itary commanders to respond and react to those attacks that fall outside 
of the “top two percent” the United States Government cares about the 
most. Furthermore, delegating the ability to respond to lower-threshold 
cyberattacks would help reinforce a credible deterrent against WMD-type 
cyberattacks as the United States would show by word and actions that it 
has the will to follow through on threats of punishment. Credible punish-
ing response options could include or be limited to law enforcement ac-
tivity, economic sanctions, or military actions. The response may be overt, 
clandestine, or covert. A cyber deterrence theory of Attributed Response 
Assured supports a national policy of strategic ambiguity, permitting the 
broadest spectrum of options for decision makers to respond on a time-
line of their choosing.
Another benefit is it helps avoid the potential for strategic miscalculation 
as it reinforces an understanding that any counterattack would be found-
ed on attributing the source of the attack. It should motivate the interna-
tional community to share information on cyber threats in order to avoid 
the potential for wrongful attribution or risk escalation. It also serves to 
reassure the international community, to include allies and adversaries 
alike, that the United States will not take action unless or until attribution 
is confirmed. Conversely, once an attacker’s identity is confirmed, poten-
tially involving the use of court-credible digital forensics, an adversary 
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is assured the United States has the will and capability to respond at a 
time and place of its choosing, consistent with its national security policy. 
A sufficient and credible investigative and forensics capability to assess 
attribution is the foundation of such a deterrence theory. It also places 
emphasis on developing capacity for a robust cybersecurity posture, fur-
ther enabling deterrence by denial. Continuing this conversation towards 
an enduring solution should involve the international community.
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 2:
International Engagement: Defining Cyber’s Role in Strategic Deterrence
As the debate over security in cyberspace continues to resonate, an issue 
of primary concern should be the recognition that the cyber domain is 
international space. As such, activity in cyberspace must comply with appli-
cable and relevant elements of international law. For those state or non-
state actors who choose to conduct offensive destructive cyberattacks, 
the effects could then be assessed as falling above or below a specific 
threshold of acceptable behavior. The United Nations should define that 
threshold and should initially consider drawing a line at cyber activity that 
produces WMD-type effects. Once a U.N.-led-international cyber WMD 
“redline” is established, it becomes clear which actions are unacceptable 
and warrant a response. However, proposals in the international communi-
ty to establish even basic “norms” in the cyber domain have stalled, leaving 
it mostly unregulated. As such, establishing a cyber WMD “norm” within the 
cyber domain may not be achievable at present through a U.N. led effort. 
A US-led approach may be necessary. In prepared remarks, the Trump 
administration’s Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossart said during 
the June 2017 “cyber week” conference that following the unsuccess-
ful conclusion to the UNGGE to clarify how international law applies in 
cyberspace, notably in the areas of self-defense, state responsibility, and 
countermeasures, that “it’s time to consider other approaches.”43 Fol-
lowing recent cyber hacks attributed to Russia it is not shocking to see 
why Russia, in particular, would not support UNGGE discussions to clarify 
countermeasures, as it might address how the United States could coun-
terattack within the constraints of international law. Consequently, Bossart 
proposed working in smaller groups of “likeminded” partners willing to act 
responsibly in cyberspace and agreeable to hunt out unacceptable behav-
ior and impose costs. He also suggested establishing bilateral agreements.
In the absence of a U.N.-led initiative, the following framework for cyber is 
recommended to build upon previous successful ‘coalition of the willing’ 
agreements to address WMD proliferation. In 2003, the Bush White House 
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established a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that sought a “coali-
tion of nations” to use existing international and domestic laws to disrupt 
the transport of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and associated 
technologies to state and non-state actors suspected of building a WMD 
program.44 There was no international treaty; rather the PSI relied upon 
collaboration between member parties. Participating states then inter-
cepted ships at sea or at domestic ports so the cargo could be inspected 
for WMD components. In 2005, National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice briefed that in two years’ time the 60 countries supporting the PSI 
had successfully stopped some WMD trafficking, including a minimum of 
11 interdictions that helped prevent Iran and others from procuring mate-
rial to enable its missile and nuclear programs, which contributed to the 
“unraveling of the A.Q. Kahn network.”45
The PSI framework could be an effective means to move the cyberattack 
discussion forward internationally. Actions taken by participating nations 
would set a precedent of accepted behavior within the international com-
munity. It may further present decision space for key states, to include 
the United States, Russia, and China, to discuss differences in opinions 
over “norms” in cyberspace openly. At best, it affords more opportunities 
through tangible and observable acts to establish cyber “norms” with 
those countries viewed as potential US adversaries.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article analyzed the growing danger of destructive cyber weapons in 
the future joint operating environment and the devastating effects they 
may have in the physical domain. Further, it outlined evidence that specif-
ically coded, offensive destructive cyber weapons would meet the spirit 
and intent of the three academic conditions for categorization as WMD. 
It argued the merits of categorizing a class of destructive cyber weapons 
as WMD, and addressed important factors required to examine advan-
tages afforded to policy makers. Towards this end, the article offered two 
recommendations for consideration to account for the value in designat-
ing a class of destructive cyber weapons as WMD. The recommendations 
included a proposed cyber deterrence theory of “Attributed Response 
Assured,” and outlined how this theory could support a US cyber policy of 
strategic ambiguity. Further, it recommended defining acceptable behav-
iors for cyber activity by the international community. In the absence of a 
U.N.-led effort, the establishment of a Proliferation Security Initiative-type 
agreement could further progress to clarify “norms” and communicates, 
“redlines.” This progress would assist policy makers in the collective effort 
towards enabling the security of a networked world against the most dan-
gerous cyber threats.
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A more secure cyberspace deters against the potential for future attacks 
capable of mass casualties or mass destruction. States and non-state 
actors considering a cyberattack, but who find network security measures 
too difficult to bypass, may pursue alternate behaviors. This approach 
is the foundation of a policy of deterrence by denial. Yet, sophisticated 
adversaries may still be able to find ways to exploit vulnerabilities. The key 
to deterrence is communicating to those considering WMD-class cyberat-
tacks that the United States has the capability to establish attribution and 
the political will to respond at a time and place of their choosing. Equally 
important is building the credibility of those threats. Policy makers should 
consider delegating to US military commanders limited authority to re-
spond to cyberattacks below the WMD threshold as a means towards en-
hanced credibility. The adversary must be effectively persuaded that the 
cost of conducting a cyberattack is too severe. These are critical elements 
of the proposed cyber deterrence theory of attributed response assured.
A sustainable deterrence requires international support. While the interna-
tional community has not yet formally established a convention categoriz-
ing cyber as a “special” weapon, it has taken steps to define “norms” for 
activity in a free and open internet. The international community, with the 
United States in a leadership role, must take action to establish common 
understanding on what constitutes the differences between criminal activity 
and the top two percent of cyberattacks that concern the DOD. While 
the international debate continues, the United States government, as one 
option, could establish national policy to define a specific class of offensive 
destructive cyber weapons as WMD. This designation could lead the inter-
national community towards a decision point on a cyber convention. Formal 
recognition by the international community on cyber “norms” will clearly 
communicate the accepted thresholds of cyber warfare, can build a founda-
tion of deterrence, and help reduce the risk of unconstrained escalation. 
Other benefits that require further examination outside the limits of this 
article is if the WMD categorization would better enable senior leaders 
to establish policies to manage the consequences of a successful attack 
resulting in mass casualties. Consistent with other WMD policies, it would 
likely also set in motion a requirement for the DOD and other government 
stakeholders to organize, train, exercise, equip, and prepare adequate 
response plans to destructive cyberattacks.46 Resources could then be al-
located and focused to account for and address the spectrum of response 
options for these threats. The September 2017 Dragon-17 exercise in War-
saw, Poland, included a test of NATO and Polish cybersecurity practices, 
and may be worth evaluating for areas to potentially benchmark in other 
military exercises.47
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The cyber WMD designation also requires further examination to assess 
if it may positively influence military equipment acquisition and procure-
ment processes. It could drive a requirement to establish within applicable 
DOD policy publications, which may include the Manual for the Operation 
of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, a category 
for US weapon systems to be designated as “cyber mission critical” similar 
to the current “CBRN mission critical” designation.48 Such a designation 
would enhance the resiliency and survivability of systems and crews to 
withstand the effects of a destructive cyberattack without losing the abil-
ity to accomplish the assigned mission. A “cyber mission critical” designa-
tion would act as a forcing function for the services to account for cyber 
resiliency and avoid acquisition of systems with cyber vulnerabilities. The 
importance of cyber resiliency was highlighted in August 2017, as the US 
Army had to issue an order to stop using specific drone aircraft procured 
from a Chinese manufacturer, as they were vulnerable to cyber malware.49
While the greater issue of cyber is vast and complex, limiting it at pres-
ent to the destructive potential of specific cyber weapons affords the 
opportunity to focus on the most dangerous malicious code, while avoid-
ing likely contentious discussions related to broader cyber topics. These 
actions align with the DOD strategic goal of “being prepared to defend 
the US homeland and US vital interests from disruptive or destructive cy-
berattacks of significant consequence” as outlined in the 2015 DOD Cyber 
Strategy.50 Policy makers can find multiple advantages that enable efforts 
to meet this goal by designating a class of specific offensive destructive 
cyber weapons as WMD. Similar to the collective efforts since 1946 to de-
ter the use of nuclear weapons, history will likely judge the decision favor-
ably if an outcome includes effectively deterring the use of unconstrained 
cyber weapons resulting in mass casualties or mass destruction.
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